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# Learning from incidents: reporting, root cause analysis and barriers

- Concept

A report is only useful if it changes something. Analysing incidents well turns one bad day into a stronger system for every later patient.

Updated Nov 19, 2026

## Key points

- Swiss cheese model: active failures at the sharp end combine with latent conditions built into the system.
- A learning system is confidential, non-punitive, analysed by experts, timely and leads to action; counting reports is not learning.
- [Just culture](https://durgical.com/en/nursing/adverse-events-reporting-analysis-and-a-just-culture/): console human error, coach at-risk behaviour, sanction reckless behaviour.
- London Protocol: chronology → care delivery problems → contributory factors → recommendations and action plan.
- Barrier strength: forcing functions and automation > standardisation and simplification > checklists and double checks > training and warnings.
- Tell the patient what happened, apologise and say what will change; the analysis does not wait for blame to be settled.

On this page

- The basics Key points
- What it is
- How to think about it
- Key facts
- Worked example
- Just culture: the response depends on the behaviour, not the outcome
- Markers
- In practice
- Common pitfalls
- Common traps
- Elsewhere in DurgiPedia

- Study Test yourself

- Connections Connections

## What it is

An incident reporting and learning system collects reports of safety events, analyses the most serious or frequent ones and feeds back changes that reduce risk. Analysis uses a systems view (the Swiss cheese model), a structured method such as root cause analysis or the London Protocol, and a just culture that separates human error from reckless choices. The output is a set of barriers, ranked by strength, plus open communication with the patient.

## How to think about it

Every layer of defence has holes: a tired doctor, a look-alike label, a missing check. Harm passes only when the holes line up. Analysis finds which holes lined up and why; strong fixes close a hole by design, weak fixes ask people to try harder.

## Key facts

- Report incidents, near misses and adverse events; near misses show the same holes at no cost.
- Decide which events get a full analysis: severe harm, high risk of recurrence or new types of failure.
- The analysis team includes people from the units involved but not those directly involved in the event, plus someone trained in the method.
- Gather the record, interviews and the setting; build a timeline before asking why.
- Care delivery problems are what went wrong in the care; contributory factors are why (patient, task, individual, team, environment, organisation).
- Each action has an owner, a date and a measure; feedback goes to the reporter and the team.

## Worked example

- A made-up laboratory finds 14 mislabelled blood samples per 10 000 in a year; one led to a near-miss transfusion of the wrong group.
- Chronology: samples from 2 patients with the same surname were labelled at the desk after drawing, in a batch of 6 tubes.
- Contributory factors: labels printed in batches (task), no bedside labelling (organisation), a night shift with 1 nurse for 18 patients (team).
- Actions ranked: bedside labelling with a wristband scan (strong), 2 identifiers at the bedside (medium), reminder posters (weak).
- The strong and medium actions are implemented; the posters alone are dropped as too weak.
- One year later: 3 mislabelled samples per 10 000, a fall of (14 − 3) ÷ 14 ≈ 79 %, with no wrong-group near misses.

## Just culture: the response depends on the behaviour, not the outcome

| Behaviour | Example | Response |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Human error | Picks the wrong vial from two identical-looking ones | Console; redesign the system |
| At-risk behaviour | Skips the second identifier because everyone does on busy nights | Coach; remove the incentive to drift |
| Reckless behaviour | Knowingly ignores a substantial risk, such as working impaired | Sanction, fairly and in proportion |

## Markers

- Swiss cheese model
- Just culture
- London Protocol
- Barrier hierarchy
- Learning system

## In practice

- When you witness an incident, make the patient safe first, then report it the same shift with facts, not opinions.
- Disclose early to the patient and family: what happened, what is being done and who to contact; keep a note of the conversation.
- Support the clinician involved: the ‘second victim’ needs help, not isolation.
- In meetings, ask ‘what made this possible?’ rather than ‘who did it?’

## Common pitfalls

- Stopping the analysis at the person: ‘retrain the nurse’ leaves the latent condition for the next patient.
- Recommending only weak actions (training, memos), because they are easy to approve.
- Collecting reports without feedback: when nothing changes, staff stop reporting.
- Judging the behaviour by the outcome: the same slip deserves the same response whether or not harm followed.

## Common traps

- **Retraining is a strong corrective action**: training and warnings sit at the bottom of the barrier hierarchy; design changes and forcing functions work even when people are tired
- **Just culture means no one is ever accountable**: it consoles error and coaches drift, but reckless disregard of a substantial risk is still sanctioned
- **A root cause analysis finds the single root cause**: serious events have several contributory factors at different levels, and each needs its own action
- **Telling the patient must wait until the analysis is finished**: disclose the facts early and update the patient as the analysis progresses

## Test yourself

Think of the answer, then tap the question to see it.

## A nurse gives a medicine from a vial that looks identical to another on the same shelf. Under just culture, what is the response?

Human error: console the nurse and redesign the system, for example by separating or relabelling look-alike vials. Punishing would not remove the hazard.

## An analysis proposes: a memo, a training session and a barcode check before dispensing. Which is the strongest barrier?

The barcode check: it is a [forcing function](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/human-factors-engineering-designing-for-real-people/) built into the process. Memos and training rely on memory and attention, the weakest barriers.

## Staff report many incidents but never hear what happened next. What will happen to reporting, and why?

It will fall: reporting takes effort, and without feedback or visible change staff conclude it is useless. A learning system must close the loop.

## In the London Protocol, what is the difference between a care delivery problem and a contributory factor?

The care delivery problem is what went wrong in the care (a sample labelled away from the patient); contributory factors explain why (batch printing, staffing, no bedside scan).

[Add to my cards (4)](https://durgical.app/estudiar/?add=/en/epidemiology/learning-from-incidents-reporting-root-cause-analysis-and-barriers/)

## Elsewhere in DurgiPedia

- [Medical error: disclosure and apology](https://durgical.com/en/medical-ethics/medical-error-disclosure-and-apology/)
- [Burnout in health workers](https://durgical.com/en/behavioral-science/burnout-in-health-workers/)

## Connections

## Related 6

- [Patient safety and adverse events](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/patient-safety-and-adverse-events/)
- [The Mandatory Quality Assurance System (SOGC)](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/the-mandatory-quality-assurance-system/)
- [Quality improvement methods: PDSA, run charts and root causes](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/quality-improvement-methods-pdsa-run-charts-and-root-causes/)
- [Pharmacovigilance and technovigilance in Colombia](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/pharmacovigilance-and-technovigilance-in-colombia/)
- [Quality of care: structure, process and outcome](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/quality-of-care-structure-process-and-outcome/)
- [Clinical leadership for doctors](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/clinical-leadership-for-doctors/)

[← All of epidemiology](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/)

Educational content on epidemiological and statistical methods; the examples use made-up numbers to teach the calculation. Not a clinical or legal guide: current Colombian rules are in the official sources.

Sources: [Patient safety incident reporting and learning systems: technical report and guidance](https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240010338) (World Health Organization, 2020); [Global Patient Safety Action Plan 2021–2030](https://www.who.int/teams/integrated-health-services/patient-safety/policy/global-patient-safety-action-plan) (World Health Organization, 2021); [Medical Error Prevention and Root Cause Analysis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK570638/) (StatPearls (NCBI Bookshelf), 2026).

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Representative model, for educational purposes only.

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Source: https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/learning-from-incidents-reporting-root-cause-analysis-and-barriers/
License: CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Cite as: DurgiPedia (durgical.com), https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/learning-from-incidents-reporting-root-cause-analysis-and-barriers/
