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# Pay for performance and value-based purchasing

- US frame (USMLE)

When part of a hospital’s or doctor’s pay depends on a quality score, behaviour follows the score, for better and for worse.

Updated Nov 19, 2026

## Key points

- P4P = part of payment tied to measured quality, not only to volume.
- Hospital programmes: Value-Based Purchasing (reward or reduction), Readmissions Reduction and HAC Reduction (payment cuts for poor results).
- Clinicians: PQRS reporting and the Value Modifier became MIPS in 2017, scoring quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting [interoperability](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/health-data-interoperability-standards-and-colombia-s-rda/).
- Public reporting acts through reputation; P4P acts through payment. Medicare uses both.
- Unintended effects: gaming, cherry-picking (avoiding high-risk patients) and neglect of what is not measured.
- Safeguards: risk adjustment and balancing measures.

On this page

- The basics Key points
- What it is
- How to think about it
- How it is organised
- Compared with Colombia’s SGSSS
- Worked example
- Ways of paying providers, and their incentives
- Markers
- Common traps

- Study Test yourself

- Connections Connections

## What it is

Pay for performance (P4P) ties part of a provider’s payment to measured quality instead of to the volume of services alone. Medicare’s value-based programmes link performance on quality measures to payment: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program and the ESRD Quality Incentive Program for facilities, and for clinicians the Value Modifier, folded in 2017 into the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Many hospital measures are also publicly reported, so the score moves reputation as well as money.

## How to think about it

Every incentive is a scoreboard with money attached. Ask three questions of any programme: what is counted, who is compared with whom, and what happens to the care that is not counted. The gains come from the first question; gaming, cherry-picking and neglect of unmeasured care come from the other two.

## How it is organised

- Hospital Value-Based Purchasing: raises or lowers a hospital’s Medicare payments according to its scores on quality, safety, patient experience and efficiency measures.
- Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: lowers payment to hospitals with more readmissions than expected for selected conditions.
- Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program: lowers payment to the worst-scoring hospitals on infections and other preventable harms acquired in hospital.
- MIPS (clinicians, from 2017): one score in four categories, quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability; clinicians in advanced alternative payment models are scored another way.
- Public reporting: hospital measures are published on Care Compare, the Medicare comparison site.

## Compared with Colombia’s SGSSS

- Colombia’s [SOGC](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/the-mandatory-quality-assurance-system/) measures quality (accessibility, timeliness, safety, appropriateness, continuity), but its sharpest consequence is regulatory: a service that fails licensing cannot be offered.
- PAMEC plays the part of a US hospital’s quality programme: each provider picks priority processes, such as appointment timeliness or guideline adherence, and audits them above the licensing level.
- Payment by results lives in the EPS–IPS contract: alongside the modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree indicators, contract by contract, not in one national programme.
- The risk is shared: in both countries, what no indicator looks at is easily neglected.

## Worked example

- Made-up Hospital Norte discharges 400 patients with [heart failure](https://durgical.com/en/conditions/heart-failure/) in a year; 88 come back within 30 days.
- Its readmission rate is 88 / 400 = 22 %. Hospitals with a similar case mix are expected to have 18 %, that is 72 readmissions.
- Excess: 88 − 72 = 16 readmissions above expected, so the readmissions programme cuts its Medicare payments.
- The hospital adds a phone call 48 hours after discharge and a clinic visit within 7 days. Next year: 64 readmissions of 400 = 16 %.
- 64 is below the expected 72, so the penalty stops.
- Balancing measure: deaths within 30 days rose from 20 to 28 of 400 (5 % to 7 %). Were sick patients kept out of hospital to protect the score?
- Reading: the target improved, but every incentive needs a balancing measure; a reward for fewer readmissions can hide harm elsewhere.

## Ways of paying providers, and their incentives

| Feature | Fee-for-service | Pay for performance | Capitation | Bundled (episode) payment |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| What is paid | Each service given | A share of payment adjusted by quality scores | A fixed amount per enrolled person per period | One amount for all care in an episode (a surgery and its recovery) |
| What it rewards | Volume | Measured results | Keeping the population healthy and cheap to treat | Efficiency within the episode |
| Who carries the cost risk | The payer | Shared, on the measured part | The provider | The provider, within the episode |
| Typical unintended effect | [Overuse](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/high-value-care-overuse-underuse-and-misuse/) | Gaming and cherry-picking | Underuse, avoiding sick enrollees | Shifting care outside the episode |
| Colombian counterpart | Pago por evento | Indicators agreed in the EPS–IPS contract | Capitación (low complexity) | Paquete or canasta per case |

## Markers

- P4P
- VBP
- HRRP
- HACRP
- MIPS
- CMS

## Common traps

- **A better score always means better care**: gaming (re-coding diagnoses, keeping a returning patient in observation instead of admitting) can improve the number without changing the care
- **P4P is fair to hospitals that treat sicker patients**: only if the measures are risk-adjusted; without adjustment, avoiding high-risk patients (cherry-picking) improves the score
- **MIPS is a hospital programme**: MIPS scores clinicians; hospitals have Value-Based Purchasing, Readmissions Reduction and HAC Reduction
- **Public reporting and pay for performance are the same**: reporting works through reputation and patient choice, P4P through money
- **If the incentive works on its target, the job is done**: incentives pull effort away from unmeasured care, so a balancing measure must be watched too

## Test yourself

Think of the answer, then tap the question to see it.

## A hospital’s 30-day readmissions fall after it starts keeping returning patients in observation status. Why is this not real improvement?

Observation is outpatient care and may not count as a readmission, so the number improves while the patients still came back: the measure was gamed, not the care improved.

## Why can paying surgeons by their unadjusted mortality rate make access worse for the sickest patients?

Without risk adjustment, each high-risk operation threatens the score, so some surgeons may decline those patients: cherry-picking.

## An older vignette mentions PQRS and a newer one MIPS. What changed in 2017?

MIPS replaced PQRS reporting, the Value Modifier and the electronic-record incentives with one clinician score: quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability.

## Where in the Colombian system is a pay-by-results incentive for a provider usually set?

In the EPS–IPS contract: together with the payment modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree the indicators the provider must meet.

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## Connections

## Related 7

- [Quality improvement methods: PDSA, run charts and root causes](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/quality-improvement-methods-pdsa-run-charts-and-root-causes/)
- [Quality of care: structure, process and outcome](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/quality-of-care-structure-process-and-outcome/)
- [How EPS pay IPS: contracts, billing and glosas](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/how-eps-pay-ips-contracts-billing-and-glosas/)
- [The Mandatory Quality Assurance System (SOGC)](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/the-mandatory-quality-assurance-system/)
- [Health economics and health policy basics: scarcity, payment incentives and how policies are made](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/health-economics-and-health-policy-basics-scarcity-payment-incentives-and-how-po/)
- [How US health care is paid for](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/how-us-health-care-is-paid-for/)
- [Medicare Parts A, B, C and D](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/medicare-parts-a-b-c-and-d/)

[← All of epidemiology](https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/)

Educational content on epidemiological and statistical methods; the examples use made-up numbers to teach the calculation. Not a clinical or legal guide: current Colombian rules are in the official sources.

Sources: [CMS' Value-Based Programs | CMS](https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality/value-based-programs) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); [Hospital Quality Initiative Public Reporting | CMS](https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality/initiatives/hospital-quality-initiative/hospital-compare) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); [Decreto 441 de 2022](https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=184728) (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2022); [Decreto 780 de 2016 Sector Salud y Protección Social](https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=77813) (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2016).

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Representative model, for educational purposes only.

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Source: https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/pay-for-performance-and-value-based-purchasing/
License: CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Cite as: DurgiPedia (durgical.com), https://durgical.com/en/epidemiology/pay-for-performance-and-value-based-purchasing/
