Pay for performance and value-based purchasing
- US frame (USMLE)
When part of a hospital’s or doctor’s pay depends on a quality score, behaviour follows the score, for better and for worse.
What it is
Pay for performance (P4P) ties part of a provider’s payment to measured quality instead of to the volume of services alone. Medicare’s value-based programmes link performance on quality measures to payment: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program and the ESRD Quality Incentive Program for facilities, and for clinicians the Value Modifier, folded in 2017 into the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Many hospital measures are also publicly reported, so the score moves reputation as well as money.
How it is organised
- Hospital Value-Based Purchasing: raises or lowers a hospital’s Medicare payments according to its scores on quality, safety, patient experience and efficiency measures.
- Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: lowers payment to hospitals with more readmissions than expected for selected conditions.
- Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program: lowers payment to the worst-scoring hospitals on infections and other preventable harms acquired in hospital.
- MIPS (clinicians, from 2017): one score in four categories, quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability; clinicians in advanced alternative payment models are scored another way.
- Public reporting: hospital measures are published on Care Compare, the Medicare comparison site.
Compared with Colombia’s SGSSS
- Colombia’s SOGC measures quality (accessibility, timeliness, safety, appropriateness, continuity), but its sharpest consequence is regulatory: a service that fails licensing cannot be offered.
- PAMEC plays the part of a US hospital’s quality programme: each provider picks priority processes, such as appointment timeliness or guideline adherence, and audits them above the licensing level.
- Payment by results lives in the EPS–IPS contract: alongside the modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree indicators, contract by contract, not in one national programme.
- The risk is shared: in both countries, what no indicator looks at is easily neglected.
Worked example
- Made-up Hospital Norte discharges 400 patients with heart failure in a year; 88 come back within 30 days.
- Its readmission rate is 88 / 400 = 22 %. Hospitals with a similar case mix are expected to have 18 %, that is 72 readmissions.
- Excess: 88 − 72 = 16 readmissions above expected, so the readmissions programme cuts its Medicare payments.
- The hospital adds a phone call 48 hours after discharge and a clinic visit within 7 days. Next year: 64 readmissions of 400 = 16 %.
- 64 is below the expected 72, so the penalty stops.
- Balancing measure: deaths within 30 days rose from 20 to 28 of 400 (5 % to 7 %). Were sick patients kept out of hospital to protect the score?
- Reading: the target improved, but every incentive needs a balancing measure; a reward for fewer readmissions can hide harm elsewhere.
Ways of paying providers, and their incentives
| Feature | Fee-for-service | Pay for performance | Capitation | Bundled (episode) payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What is paid | Each service given | A share of payment adjusted by quality scores | A fixed amount per enrolled person per period | One amount for all care in an episode (a surgery and its recovery) |
| What it rewards | Volume | Measured results | Keeping the population healthy and cheap to treat | Efficiency within the episode |
| Who carries the cost risk | The payer | Shared, on the measured part | The provider | The provider, within the episode |
| Typical unintended effect | Overuse | Gaming and cherry-picking | Underuse, avoiding sick enrollees | Shifting care outside the episode |
| Colombian counterpart | Pago por evento | Indicators agreed in the EPS–IPS contract | Capitación (low complexity) | Paquete or canasta per case |
Markers
- P4P
- VBP
- HRRP
- HACRP
- MIPS
- CMS
Common traps
- A better score always means better care: gaming (re-coding diagnoses, keeping a returning patient in observation instead of admitting) can improve the number without changing the care
- P4P is fair to hospitals that treat sicker patients: only if the measures are risk-adjusted; without adjustment, avoiding high-risk patients (cherry-picking) improves the score
- MIPS is a hospital programme: MIPS scores clinicians; hospitals have Value-Based Purchasing, Readmissions Reduction and HAC Reduction
- Public reporting and pay for performance are the same: reporting works through reputation and patient choice, P4P through money
- If the incentive works on its target, the job is done: incentives pull effort away from unmeasured care, so a balancing measure must be watched too
Test yourself
Think of the answer, then tap the question to see it.
A hospital’s 30-day readmissions fall after it starts keeping returning patients in observation status. Why is this not real improvement?
Observation is outpatient care and may not count as a readmission, so the number improves while the patients still came back: the measure was gamed, not the care improved.
Why can paying surgeons by their unadjusted mortality rate make access worse for the sickest patients?
Without risk adjustment, each high-risk operation threatens the score, so some surgeons may decline those patients: cherry-picking.
An older vignette mentions PQRS and a newer one MIPS. What changed in 2017?
MIPS replaced PQRS reporting, the Value Modifier and the electronic-record incentives with one clinician score: quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability.
Where in the Colombian system is a pay-by-results incentive for a provider usually set?
In the EPS–IPS contract: together with the payment modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree the indicators the provider must meet.
Connections
Educational content on epidemiological and statistical methods; the examples use made-up numbers to teach the calculation. Not a clinical or legal guide: current Colombian rules are in the official sources.
Sources: CMS' Value-Based Programs | CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); Hospital Quality Initiative Public Reporting | CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); Decreto 441 de 2022 (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2022); Decreto 780 de 2016 Sector Salud y Protección Social (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2016).
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Representative model, for educational purposes only.
