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Pay for performance and value-based purchasing

  • US frame (USMLE)

When part of a hospital’s or doctor’s pay depends on a quality score, behaviour follows the score, for better and for worse.

Updated

What it is

Pay for performance (P4P) ties part of a provider’s payment to measured quality instead of to the volume of services alone. Medicare’s value-based programmes link performance on quality measures to payment: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program and the ESRD Quality Incentive Program for facilities, and for clinicians the Value Modifier, folded in 2017 into the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Many hospital measures are also publicly reported, so the score moves reputation as well as money.

How it is organised

  • Hospital Value-Based Purchasing: raises or lowers a hospital’s Medicare payments according to its scores on quality, safety, patient experience and efficiency measures.
  • Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program: lowers payment to hospitals with more readmissions than expected for selected conditions.
  • Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program: lowers payment to the worst-scoring hospitals on infections and other preventable harms acquired in hospital.
  • MIPS (clinicians, from 2017): one score in four categories, quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability; clinicians in advanced alternative payment models are scored another way.
  • Public reporting: hospital measures are published on Care Compare, the Medicare comparison site.

Compared with Colombia’s SGSSS

  • Colombia’s SOGC measures quality (accessibility, timeliness, safety, appropriateness, continuity), but its sharpest consequence is regulatory: a service that fails licensing cannot be offered.
  • PAMEC plays the part of a US hospital’s quality programme: each provider picks priority processes, such as appointment timeliness or guideline adherence, and audits them above the licensing level.
  • Payment by results lives in the EPS–IPS contract: alongside the modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree indicators, contract by contract, not in one national programme.
  • The risk is shared: in both countries, what no indicator looks at is easily neglected.

Worked example

  1. Made-up Hospital Norte discharges 400 patients with heart failure in a year; 88 come back within 30 days.
  2. Its readmission rate is 88 / 400 = 22 %. Hospitals with a similar case mix are expected to have 18 %, that is 72 readmissions.
  3. Excess: 88 − 72 = 16 readmissions above expected, so the readmissions programme cuts its Medicare payments.
  4. The hospital adds a phone call 48 hours after discharge and a clinic visit within 7 days. Next year: 64 readmissions of 400 = 16 %.
  5. 64 is below the expected 72, so the penalty stops.
  6. Balancing measure: deaths within 30 days rose from 20 to 28 of 400 (5 % to 7 %). Were sick patients kept out of hospital to protect the score?
  7. Reading: the target improved, but every incentive needs a balancing measure; a reward for fewer readmissions can hide harm elsewhere.

Ways of paying providers, and their incentives

FeatureFee-for-servicePay for performanceCapitationBundled (episode) payment
What is paidEach service givenA share of payment adjusted by quality scoresA fixed amount per enrolled person per periodOne amount for all care in an episode (a surgery and its recovery)
What it rewardsVolumeMeasured resultsKeeping the population healthy and cheap to treatEfficiency within the episode
Who carries the cost riskThe payerShared, on the measured partThe providerThe provider, within the episode
Typical unintended effectOveruseGaming and cherry-pickingUnderuse, avoiding sick enrolleesShifting care outside the episode
Colombian counterpartPago por eventoIndicators agreed in the EPS–IPS contractCapitación (low complexity)Paquete or canasta per case

Markers

  • P4P
  • VBP
  • HRRP
  • HACRP
  • MIPS
  • CMS

Common traps

  • A better score always means better care: gaming (re-coding diagnoses, keeping a returning patient in observation instead of admitting) can improve the number without changing the care
  • P4P is fair to hospitals that treat sicker patients: only if the measures are risk-adjusted; without adjustment, avoiding high-risk patients (cherry-picking) improves the score
  • MIPS is a hospital programme: MIPS scores clinicians; hospitals have Value-Based Purchasing, Readmissions Reduction and HAC Reduction
  • Public reporting and pay for performance are the same: reporting works through reputation and patient choice, P4P through money
  • If the incentive works on its target, the job is done: incentives pull effort away from unmeasured care, so a balancing measure must be watched too

Test yourself

Think of the answer, then tap the question to see it.

A hospital’s 30-day readmissions fall after it starts keeping returning patients in observation status. Why is this not real improvement?

Observation is outpatient care and may not count as a readmission, so the number improves while the patients still came back: the measure was gamed, not the care improved.

Why can paying surgeons by their unadjusted mortality rate make access worse for the sickest patients?

Without risk adjustment, each high-risk operation threatens the score, so some surgeons may decline those patients: cherry-picking.

An older vignette mentions PQRS and a newer one MIPS. What changed in 2017?

MIPS replaced PQRS reporting, the Value Modifier and the electronic-record incentives with one clinician score: quality, cost, improvement activities and promoting interoperability.

Where in the Colombian system is a pay-by-results incentive for a provider usually set?

In the EPS–IPS contract: together with the payment modality (capitation, global prospective payment, packages) the parties agree the indicators the provider must meet.

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Connections

← All of epidemiology

Educational content on epidemiological and statistical methods; the examples use made-up numbers to teach the calculation. Not a clinical or legal guide: current Colombian rules are in the official sources.

Sources: CMS' Value-Based Programs | CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); Hospital Quality Initiative Public Reporting | CMS (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2026); Decreto 441 de 2022 (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2022); Decreto 780 de 2016 Sector Salud y Protección Social (Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública, Colombia (Gestor Normativo), 2016).

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Representative model, for educational purposes only.